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Abstract – This note presents the consequences of output 
persistence being disregarded by an electorally motivated 
incumbent. In this case, incumbent’s policies are 
suboptimal not only socially but also from the electoral 
point of view. 
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1. Introduction 
The consequences arising from the fact that real 
variables, such as unemployment or output, exhibit a 
degree of persistence over time have been analysed 
since some time ago (see, e.g., Jonsson, 1997; 
Lockwood, 1997; Svensson, 1997; Caleiro, 2012). A 
particularly interesting consequence of output 
persistence is that it may turn upside down the political 
business cycle, which, in its typical form, is associated 
with depressions at the beginning of the mandate 
followed by pre-election inflationary expansions 
(Gärtner, 1996; Gärtner, 1997; Caleiro, 2009). 
Somehow related to this result is the fact that, when the 
rationality of the electorate is bounded, an error on the 
classification, by the electorate, of the incumbent’s 
behavior, may exist, when the level of output displays 
persistence (Caleiro, 2013). 
A recent observation of reality seems to confirm that the 
typical pattern of the electoral cycle seems to be so 
deep-rooted that an electorally motivated government, 
whose rationality is also bounded, considers that it must 
implement a (more than socially desirable) 
contractionary policy at the beginning of the mandate, 
so that, at the end of the mandate, it has (better) 
conditions to implement expansionary policies. A 
behavior of that type by the incumbent also seems to 
reveal that it may also act under the veil of ignorance (of 
the persistence in output). In other words, when 
determining the economic policy the incumbent may use 
a stylized model, this model being imperfect due to the 
ignorance of output persistence (Chow, 1977). In this 
case, incumbent’s policies are suboptimal not only 
socially but also from the electoral point of view. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
offers the correct model, i.e. the one ruling the true 
functioning of the economy, which is based upon an 
aggregate supply curve embodying output persistence, 
as well as the imperfect model, i.e. the one considered 
by the incumbent, which disregards output persistence. 
Section 3 concludes. 
2. The Models 
Recently some authors have assumed an extended 
version of the standard aggregate supply curve  ettt yy   , where ty  denotes the level of 
output,  that deviates from the natural level, y , 
whenever the inflation rate, t , deviates from its 
expected level et , by considering  
   etttt yyy   11 , (1) 
where   measures the degree of output persistence. See 
Gärtner (1999) for an output persistence case and/or 
Jonsson (1997) for an unemployment persistence case.  
When normalizing the natural level of output such that 
0y  the aggregate supply curve reduces to: 
 etttt yy   1 , (2) 
where, following the hypothesis of adaptive 
expectations, 
  ettet 11 1    , (3) 
where 10    and 10   . 
Model (2) is thus the correct representation of the 
functioning of the economy. When disregarding the 
existence of persistence in output, an imperfect model is 
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